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est. Although the individual has lost his right to expect that his private business papers will be inviolate, this cost can be justified by the fact that fourth
amendment restrictions on the seizure of documents are retained, while fifth
amendment restraints are removed.
The expansion in Boyd of the fifth amendment to include document immunity was the product of judicial overreaching to decide an issue not raised
by the case. The holding of the instant case overruled the last of that dicta and
has completed the process of dismantling Boyd. Thus it is appropriate to consider that: "Respect for . . .[constitutional] principles is eroded when they
leap their proper bounds to interfere wth the legitimate interest of society in
enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues."7 s
HENRY H. BoLz, III

LABOR LAW: THE REFUSAL OF NON-UNION WORK AS A BASIS
FOR DISQUALIFICATION IN FLORIDA'S UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION LAW
Adams v. Auchter Co., 839 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1976)
Claimant, an unemployed member of Carpenter's Local Union 627, was
offered1 non-union work at slightly less than the union wage scale. 2 Because
his union prohibited the acceptance of any non-union work at less than union
wage, he refused the offer. Subsequently, the claims examiner for the Department of Commerce discontinued his unemployment compensation since he had
refused suitable work.3 The Industrial Relations Commission reversed and
reinstated the unemployment benefits; 4 but the First District Court of Appeal

78.

Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1972).

1. Adams v. Auchter Co., 339 So. 2d 623, 624 (Fla. 1976) (Adkins, J., dissenting). Claimant
complied with Florida law to the extent that he actively sought work. He did not rely solely
on his union's referral service, but sought employment on his own initiative. See Florida
Indus. Comm'n v. Ciarlante, 84 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1955); Dawkins v. Florida Indus. Comm'n,
155 So. 2d 153, 154-55 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Teague v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 104 So. 2d
612, 614 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
2. The union wage scale was $7.56 per hour. Since $.91 per hour is kept by the union to

fund its program, the union member would take home $6.65 per hour. Claimant was offered
non-union employment at $7.00 per hour, although the average wage scale for carpenters in
that area (Orange Park) was $3.62 per hour, the low being $1.70 per hour and the high
being $6.00 per hour. Auchter Co. v. Florida Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 304 So. 2d 487 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1975).

3. This determination was based on FLA. STAT. §443.06(2) (1975). On appeal, the referee
affirmed for the reason that the claimant-petitioner had materially reduced his chances for
securing employment because of self-imposed restrictions and hence could not be considered
to have been available for work as required by FLA. STAT. §443.05(1)(c)1 (1975). 304 So. 2d at
487.
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quashed that decision.5 On certiorari the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed"
and HELD, that unemployment benefits were properly withheld from the
claimant because his refusal to accept otherwise suitable work on the ground
that it did not conform to union standards was not a refusal with good cause in
accordance with Florida law.7

The social emphasis of congressional legislation in the 1930's was characterized by enactments protecting labor unions and supporting the unemployed.
With the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 8 in 1932 and the National Labor
Relations Act 9 in 1935 a federal policy encouraging unionism replaced one of
mere tolerance. The new policy represented a belief that through collective
bargaining the employee could meet on an equal basis with his employer to
negotiate wages, hours, and working conditions. 10 Contemporaneously," the
12
unemployed found relief through the Old Age and Survivor's Insurance Act
13
which provided a tax offset device to encourage the formation of state unemployment insurance programs. 14 Because economic insecurity was viewed as
a menace to the welfare of society, the programs were designed to maintain
the purchasing power of the unemployed by making available subsistence
4. The Commission found that the claimant, as a consequence of accepting the offered
employment, would have been subjected to discipline and would have been deprived of
union benefits which inure to his advantage in terms of retirement and medical benefits. The
Commission then determined that the claimant could not have been expected to make this
sacrifice in order to receive unemployment compensation because such a result would not be
consonant with the national labor relations policy. Id. at 488.

5. Id.
6.

Adams v. Auchter Co., 339 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1976).

7.

FLA. STAT. §443.06(2) (1975).

8. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1952).
9. Originally called the Wagner Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), the NLRA was later amended
by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§141-188 (1952).
10. The Norris-LaGuardia Act attempted to equalize labor's economic weapons with
those of employers by removing certain judicial restraints. Going even further, the National
Labor Relations Act declared that employees should be given the right to collectively bargain
because such bargaining was a desirable means of setting wages, hours, and working conditions. The 1947 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act retained the purpose of
encouraging collective bargaining, but subjected that purpose to an overall policy of protecting
the interests of employers and individual employees as well as of unions. See Jones, The
Conflict Between Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance, 28 ROCKY MOUNT. L.
REV. 185 (1956).

The power of Congress to pass the National Labor Relations Act extends from the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The broad interpretation of that provision by
the Supreme Court of the United States carried federal authority into fields traditionally the
sole domain of the states. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
11. For a discussion of the parallel development of union policy and unemployment insurance, see generally Jones, supra note 10.
12. 49 STAT. 620 (1935-36), 26 U.S.C. § §3301-3310 (1970).
13. See Jones, supra note 10, at 186.
14. The Florida legislature responded by passing the Unemployment Compensation Law.
This statute was designed to establish free public employment offices in the state and to
accumulate funds to benefit those who were unemployed through no fault of their own.
Responsibility for the administration of the program was placed in the Florida Industrial
Commission. FLA. STAT. ch. 443 (1975).
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checks and job finding agencies. 15 Eligibility requirements specified that the
worker be unemployed, that he be able to work, and that he be available for
work.16
The Florida Unemployment Compensation Law paralleled the federal labor
policy protecting unionism in that both were designed to benefit the working
8
people.17 Because of this similarity of purpose the disqualification provisions'
of the Unemployment Compensation Law do not conflict with the goals of the
National Labor Relations Act. For instance, an unemployed worker is not
disqualified from unemployment benefits for refusing work which is available
because of a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute.' 9 Without such a provision
the unemployed worker would be encouraged to accept the work, reducing the
effectiveness of the strike.
While the Unemployment Compensation Law was not meant to undercut
labor law's objectives, neither was it meant to actively promote them. This
tension of restrained cooperation has made it inevitable that the purposes of
the two statutory schemes would not coincide in certain situations. For instance,
because the Unemployment Compensation Law has limited its benefits to those
who are involuntarily20 unemployed, unemployment funds have not been
awarded to workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute. 21 A labor
dispute was considered a voluntary act and unemployment resulting from it
was held to be the fault of the laborer.22 The argument for such a disqualification was that the Unemployment Compensation Law was not designed to
finance disputes, 22 but to help those who are unemployed through no fault of
their own.
15. See FLA. STAT. §443.02 (1975).
16. For additional requirements see FLA. STAT. §443.05 (1975).
17. See Jones, supra note 10.
18. FLA. STAT. §443.06(2)(b) (1975) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this chapter, no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this
chapter to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the
following conditions: (1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute; (2) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the
locality; (3) If as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join
a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization."
The three-pronged exemptions to disqualification are required in all states for approval
of their unemployment compensation law. See 26 U.S.C. §3304(a)(5) (1970).
19. FLA. STAT. §443.06(2) (1975).
20. For a discussion of how the term "involuntary" can be misleading, see Sanders, Disqualificationfor Unemployment Insurance, 8 VANI. L. REV. 307, 310 (1954).
21. FLA. STAT. §443.06(4) (1975). See, e.g., Post-Times Co. v. Turner, 123 So. 2d 359 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1960); Olusczak v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 230 So. 2d 31 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
22. Sometimes courts are placed in a philosophical dilemma in applying the labor dispute
disqualification. While the purpose of the disqualification may be that the state desires to
remain neutral in disputes, the courts may also be aware that unemployment compensation
is meant to be remedial and liberally construed to achieve its beneficial purposes. See Comment, Labor Controversies and Unemployment Compensation, 36 ALB. L. REv. 95 (1971); e.g.,
O'Brian v. Michigan Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 309 Mich. 18, 14 N.W.2d 560 (1944).
23. Striking laborers stand to gain by the economic pressures they exert. To insure them
a guaranteed income during the dispute would unequally increase the power and stamina
of the union at the bargaining table. See Commentary, Unemployment Benefits in Labor
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This posture of restrained cooperation is also illustrated by the provision
which allows a claimant to refuse offered work when as a condition of employment he is required to resign from any bona fide labor organization. 24 Although
this provision has been interpreted to include conditions imposed by the employer, courts have not extended it to include conditions imposed by the
claimant's union. This distinction arises when unions, in order to maintain
the standards of acceptable working conditions, have dictated to their unemployed members not to accept inferior work. 25 But "inferior work" may nonetheless be considered suitable work under the Unemployment Compensation
Law, and an unemployed union member may disqualify himself from benefits
by complying with his union's requests. Thus, in Bigger v. Unemployment
Compensation Commission,26 disqualification resulted when an unemployed
worker refused non-union work at slightly less than union wage because his
union threatened to expel any member that accepted work below the union
scale. In Bigger, the claimant contended that this situation was the same as if
he had been required to resign from a bona fide labor organization as a condition of employment. In rejecting this contention, the court pointed out that
the statute was designed to protect a prospective employee against unfair labor
conditions imposed by an employer, not to enforce demands of the employee
or standards of his union.27
The Bigger case and others2s defined the public policy behind the unemControversies: The Anachronisms of the Establishment Doctrine, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 715
(1967).
24. See note 18 supra.
25. Unions feel that their bargaining achievements would be undermined if one of their
members were to accept work below union standards. See Mandelker, Refusals to Work and
Union Objectives in the Administration of Taft-Hartley and Unemployment Compensation,
44 CORNELL L. Q. 477, 503 (1952).
26. 43 Del. 553, 53 A.2d 761 (1947).
27. Id. at 563, 53 A.2d at 766.
28. Under similar facts, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Mills v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n, 89 So. 2d 727 (Miss. 1956), held that the claimant was not "available for
work" when he refused suitable employment on the sole ground that he might be subject to
fine or expulsion from his union for accepting that employment. The court insisted that the
legislature did not intend to give effect to union regulations in determining whether a
claimant has forfeited his rights to receive benefits. Id. at 730. Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania in Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 356 Pa. 43,
50 A.2d 336, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), on the same facts, reasoned that to allow
compensation in such a case would be the equivalent of permitting a union to adopt its own
definition of suitable work and determine by rule and bylaws what constitutes good cause for
refusing referred employment. Id. at 52, 50 A.2d at 341. Finally, in Chambers v. Owens-AmesKimball Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N.E.2d 439 (1946), the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that
the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions would be violated if a
union member was allowed to refuse suitable work while a non-union member was not.
Arguably, the discriminatory treatment alluded to in the Ohio case would not violate the
equal protection clause of the federal constitution. Unless the discrimination involves a
"suspect classification" such as race or religion the Supreme Court of the United States will
only subject the discriminatory treatment to a "rational relation" test. If a rational state
objective can be found and the discrimination is reasonably designed to achieve its purpose,
then there is no violation of the equal protection clause. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970). The Supreme Court of Ohio, however, effectively insulated its decision from
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ployment compensation laws in the context of union rights. Although the right
to union membership was recognized as an aspect of national policy, it was not
intended to create a special privilege in terms of unemployment benefits. The
courts treating the issue have emphasized that the unemployment compensation law was intended to benefit those who are unemployed because of conditions over which they have no control, and who are willing, anxious, and ready
9
to obtain employment.
0
The lower court" in the instant case analyzed Florida's Unemployment
Compensation Law 1 against this background of judicial recognition of restrained cooperation between pro-union legislation and unemployment benefits.
No other Florida court had ever faced the particular problem of an unemployed union member being denied benefits because of his refusal to accept
non-union work.3 2 The claimant contended that by accepting non-union employment he would have deprived himself of union retirement and medical
benefits and subjected himself to union discipline and a fine. Certainly, he
argued, the court's interpretation of the Unemployment Compensation Law
should not be so restricted as to force him, as a condition to qualification for
benefits, to jeopardize his rights acquired through years of union membership.
The lower court responded that under Florida law3 3 the conditions which
rendered work unsuitable and subject to permissable rejection by the prospective employee were only those imposed by the employer. Here, the union and
not the employer or the State of Florida threatened to impose sanctions upon
the claimant. Thus, the lower court recognized the union's right to adopt rules
for governing its members but concluded that the benefits should be withheld

review by the Supreme Court of the United States. If a state decision will rest on independent
state grounds (state constitution) the Supreme Court will refuse to hear the case.
29. Although not in the context of union right, a Florida case, Florida Indus. Comm'n
v. Ciarlante,.84 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1955), has interpreted the meaning behind "availability for
work" to be largely a subjective term designed to test the individual's continued and current
attachment to the labor force. The court stated that the Florida courts up until 1955 had not
defined the term "availability," but other courts had. The Ciarlante court showed a particular
reliance on those other state courts. Id. at 3. The term, according to Schettino v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 138 Conn. 253, 260, 83 A.2d 217, 220 (Sup. Ct. of
Errors, 1951), means that the person must be exposed unequivocally to the labor market. A
Minnesota case, Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 456, 61
N.W.2d 526, 531 (1953), said: "In order to give effect to the act a person must be ready and
willing to accept suitable work. The act is intended to benefit persons who are unemployed
through no fault of their own and who are genuinely attached to the labor market."
Ciarlante also cited Pizura v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 331 Mass. 320, 118
N.E.2d 771 (1954), saying, "A factor to be considered is the claimant's mental attitude, i.e.,
whether he wants to go to work or is content to remain idle." Florida Indus. Comm'n v.
Ciarlante, 84 So. 2d at 3. The Ciarlante case dealt with a seasonal worker who made a few
unsuccessful attempts to find work. See also Teague v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 104 So. 2d
612 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
30. Auchter Co. v. Florida Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 304 So. 2d 487 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1974).

31.

FLA. STAT. ch. 443 (1975).

32. A possible exception is the unreported case of Cartwright v. Carbone, Inc., cert.
denied, 247 So. 2d 804 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
33. See note 18 supra.
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since by imposing the restrictions the union, and no one else, created the
4
claimant's dilemma3
Although the claimant also asserted an abridgment of his union rights as
protected by article I, section 6 of the Florida Constitution, the court saw no
constitutional issue at stake because the claimant had not shown an actual
infringement of such rights. 35 Even if actual infringement could be shown,
however, the court noted that the provision was inapplicable since it was the
union and not the employer or the State of Florida which imposed such re36
strictions on union membership.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court of Florida agreed
that the claimant had failed without good cause to accept suitable work. 37
Admitting that there was little that could be added to the appellate court's
opinion, the court merely noted that the decision was in accord with virtually
every state that has considered the question.38 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the holding comported with the basic philosophy of the unemployment
compensation law that the funds should be used only for the benefit of persons
unemployed through no fault of their own.39 The majority, however, did not
address a constitutional issue.
The dissent, on the other hand, focused on the constitutional question
ignored by the majority. 4° Since none of the states cited by the majority had a
constitutional provision guaranteeing the right of employees to bargain collectively through a labor organization 4l comparable to Florida's, 42 the dissent

34. 304 So. 2d at 489.
35. The court felt that the petitioner's fear of losing his union benefits was in fact
illusory, quoting Commissioner Coleman, the dissenter in the two to one vote of the Industrial Commission which held that the petitioner was eligible for unemployment benefits.
Coleman made reference to the years since 1939 in which he had served as an appeal referee
and general counsel for the Commission. "'During such period there were many occasions
when the same contention was made by union members as is made in the case sub judice,
i.e., that if a union member accepted nonunion work he would be subject to disciplinary
action. In the course of the history of this Commissioner, in hearing appeals, some of which
involved this contention and in representing the Florida Industrial Commission and the
Board of Rcview he has no recollection of any instance when any evidence was ever submitted or incorporated in any case record wherein any such disciplinary action had ever
been imposed upon any union members for accepting suitable work solely because it was
with a nonunion employer.'" 304 So. 2d at 489.
36. Id.
37. Adams v. Auchter Co., 339 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1976).
38. See Thornbrough v. Stewart, 232 Ark. 53, 334 S.W.2d 699 (1960); Lemelin v. Administrator, Unemployment Comp. Act, 27 C.S. 446, 242 A.2d 786 (1968); Bigger v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 43 Del. 553, 53 A.2d 761 (1947); Norman v. Employment Sec. Agency,
83 Idaho 1, 356 P.2d 913 (1960); Miville v. Maine Employment Sec. Comm'n, 219 A.2d 752
(Me. 1966); Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Mixon, 248 Miss. 399, 159 So. 2d 181
(1964); Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N.E.2d 439 (1946);
Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 56 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336, cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
39. FLA. STAT. §443.02 (1975).
40. 339 So. 2d at 624 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
41. Only two of the states cited in the majority opinion have any constitutional provisions dealing with union rights: Arkansas and Mississippi. These provisions, however, are
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deemed the public policy of these states to be irrelevant. Therefore, the dissent argued that Florida's public policy cannot be construed on the basis of the
Unemployment Compensation Law alone. 43 A reconstruction of the dissenting
argument reveals a presupposition that if collective bargaining is a protected
right, so must be the right to union membership; otherwise, the constitutional
right would be of no effect. 44 From that premise the dissent concluded that
union membership, independent of bargaining activity, was a right beyond
infringement of the state.4 5 Therefore, the state4 6 could not force the claimant
in no way comparable to Florida's broadly stated right to bargain collectively. See note 42
infra.
ARK. CONST. amend. 34, §1 provides: "No person shall be denied employment because of
membership in or affiliation with or resignation from a labor union, or because of refusal
to join or affiliate with a labor union; nor shall any corporation or individual or association
of any kind enter into any contract, written or oral, to exclude from employment members
of a labor union or persons who refuse to join a labor union, or because of resignation from
a labor union; nor shall any person against his will be compelled to pay dues to any labor
organization as a prerequisite to or condition of employment."
Miss. CONsT. art. 7, §198-A provides: "It is hereby declared to be the public policy of
Mississippi that the right of a person or persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on
account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union or labor organization."
42. FLA. CoNsr. art. I, §6 provides in part: "The right of persons to work shall not be
denied or abridged on account of union membership or non-membership in any labor union
or labor organization. The right of employees, by and through a labor organization, to
bargain collectively shall not be denied or abridged."
43. To support his argument Justice Adkins cited a New York case, In re Grandin's

Claim, 19 App. Div. 2d 448, 243 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1963), which upheld a union member's right to refuse non-union work with no clear proof that his union rights would be
infringed. This decision he attributed to New York's constitution which provides: "Employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing." N.Y. CONsr. art. I, §17. The result in this case, however, was probably dictated by a New York statute reflecting a very strong pro-union public policy: "No
refusal to accept unemployment shall be deemed without good cause nor shall it disqualify
any claimant otherwise eligible to receive benefits if acceptance of such employment would
.. interfere with his ... retaining membership in any labor organization .... " N.Y. LABoR
LAw §593(2)(a) (McKinney 1958). See Mandelker, supra note 26, at 516, which explains that
the concentration of unionization in the locality may affect standards used to interpret the
"suitability" of proffered employment.
44. 339 So. 2d at 625 (Adkins, J., dissenting). "To deny petitioner unemployment compensation is to deny him the right to bargain collectively as a union member. The decision
of the District Court penalizes petitioner for exercising a constitutionally protected right. The
State cannot ignore this right by compelling petitioner to choose between unemployment
benefits and union membership." Id. (emphasis added).

45. This method of constitutional construction resembles that of Justice Douglas in his
majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). That case upheld the
right of married people to use contraceptives in the privacy of their home. Justice Douglas
asserted that there are many rights which are not specifically included in the Constitution,
but which are peripheral to those expressed rights and "necessary in making the express
guarantees fully meaningful." Id. at 483. The "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. Justice Douglas reasoned that the various guarantees created "zones of
privacy." Id.
Justice Douglas' method of constitutional construction does not necessarily lend any support to Justice Adkins' attempt to create a general right to union membership from the
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to trade away a constitutional right in order to remain qualified under the
unemployment compensation program. To strengthen the argument the dissent referred to section 447.03 of the Florida statutes as a legislative declaration
paralleling the public policy of article I, section 6. That statute guarantees
the right to self-organization for the purposes of collective bargaining. The
dissent asserted that Florida's policy to protect the rights of union membership
was, therefore, declared legislatively as well as constitutionally.47 This valuable
collective bargaining clause. In contrast, the right to privacy is now viewed as a "fundamental" value "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). It is only one of many values which compose the
body of law referred to as substantive due process. Those rights find protection not just as
peripheral aspects of explicit protections, but as aspects of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold v.
Connecticut, see note 57 infra.
46. This issue of state involvement is illustrated by the case of Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), which is in many ways analogous to the instant case. In that case the
petitioner, a Seventh Day Adventist, refused proffered work because it would have required
her to work on Saturdays, her clay of worship. The Supreme Court of the United States ruled
that the state violated petitioner's freedom of religion by forcing her to choose between unemployment benefits and her religious convictions.
The Sherbert case, which embodied the federal doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
stands for the notion that a state cannot condition a statutory right upon the waiver of a
federal constitutional right. "If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right
as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivembedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
able that guaranties [sic]
manipulated out of existence." Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926). See Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 144 (1968).
Arguably, in the Sherbert case, the state infringement of the constitutional right was more
direct than in the instant case. The employer created an unreasonable condition of employment which the state sanctioned. In the instant case, the union, and not the employer, presented an unreasonable condition. If this distinction is significant, federal case law offers
another doctrine which may suggest the necessary connection for the instant case. William
Van Alstyne, in his article The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968), described the doctrine of indirect effects as an extension
to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Even though a state does not directly infringe
a constitutional right by a particular statute, the Supreme Court of the United States has
occasionally protected the petitioner "by emphasizing the 'unconstitutional effect' of the
regulation ...." Id. at 1449. But the test is more complex for it involves an attempt to
balance competing "public and private concerns to determine whether the regulation as applied has a sufficient connection with important enough state interests to outweigh the
incidental effect on the constitutional rights of the affected class." Id. See Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
This material is offered by way of analogy and is not meant to suggest that the doctrines
of federal constitutional law necessarily govern Florida constitutional interpretation.
47. The dissent also cited the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §151 (1973), as
declaring that union membership is a federal right. If he means to say that union membership, beyond the purpose of collective bargaining, is a federal right protected from any
direct or indirect state influence, then the discussion of article I, §6 is superfluous. The
federal law, if applicable, would preempt any state constitution or statute. See Lodge 76,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aero-Space Workers, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976).
If Congress had meant for the National Labor Relations Act to give union membership
special protection in terms of unemployment compensation disqualification, that protection
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right, according to the dissent, should remain a matter of free choice for the
4
worker, unhindered or unintimidated by any outside force. 1
This dispute between the district court and the dissent as to the protection
the constitution affords to union membership and the extent to which it
modifies the scope of Florida's Unemployment Compensation Law can be
partially explained by the fact that the district court, in finding no abridgement of article I, section 6, seemed to interpret a different clause than did the
dissent. The lower court apparently interpreted the "right to work" clause4 9
while the dissent was concerned with the constitutionally protected right to
collectively bargain.
The "right to work" provision guarantees that the right to work shall not
be denied or abridged on account of union membership. Although the district
court correctly concluded that this constitutional provision was inapplicable to
the claimant's cause, its explanation was insufficient. 50 The provision was inapplicable for two reasons. First, the "right to work" must be understood as
protecting union membership only to the extent that such membership cannot
become the basis of discriminatory treatment so as to reduce the injured party's
chances for obtaining work. 51 Clearly, neither the employer nor the state was
restricting the claimant's opportunities for work. Second, the "right to work"
already has partial protection in the Unemployment Compensation Law. If,
hypothetically, a prospective employer did infringe a claimant's right to work
because of union affiliation, that employer would have created a condition of
employment specifically identified as unsuitable in the disqualification provisions. 52 The claimant would have been eligible for unemployment benefits
would have been reflected in 26 U.S.C. §3304(a)(5) (1970), which outlines acceptable reasons
for refusing new work. See note 18 supra.
48. For a similarly broad statement of public policy toward union membership, see
Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1950), where the court stated that
working men "are guaranteed complete freedom of decision in whether to join or refrain
from joining any labor organization .... They are not to be coerced or intimidated in the
enjoyment of their legal rights, including the right of free decision as to whether or not they
will join a union .... Id.
49. The district court never specified which aspect of article I, §6 it was addressing. But,
the court seemed to dismiss Article I, §6 with the same argument it used to dismiss claimant's
contention that he was required to resign from a labor organization, i.e., the disqualification
provision of FLA. STAT. §443.06(2)(b)3 (1975). See text accompanying note 24 supra. The
response to both of claimant's arguments is that it is the union and not the employer or the
state which imposes the sanctions. This similarity in response can be explained because the
"right to work" clause operates in a way similar to the disqualification provision. Both provide protection from discriminatory treatment on the basis of union membership. The parallel
manner in which the court dismissed the arguments has led, therefore, to the conclusion that
the court was construing the "right to work" clause. 304 So. 2d at 489 (1976).
50. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
51. The right to work clause "dearly bestows on the workingman a right to join or not
to join a labor union, as he sees fit, without jeopardizing his job." Schermerhorn v. Local
1625 of'Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 141 So. 2d 269, 272, aff'd, 375 U.S. 96 (1963). "Under these
provisions it is the declared public policy of the State that all working men, whether union
or non-union, shall be considered on an equal footing with respect to labor opportunities."
Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1950).
52. See note 18 supra.
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by the force of the Unemployment Compensation Law itself, not because of a
constitutional violation. Therefore, the "right to work" clause does nothing to
expand the scope of the Unemployment Compensation Law, and the lower
court properly dismissed that claim.
The dissent felt that there was merit to the claimant's constitutional argument because of the "right to collectively bargain" clause. To the dissent that
clause created an unqualified right to union membership. Though the majority
of the supreme court did not address this issue, close analysis of the dissent's
argument reveals inherent defects. Union membership, independent of bargaining activity, is not a constitutional right. The protected activity is, by definition,53 that which is dedicated to improving the conditions of employment.
Unless union membership affects the quality of that activity, the claimant cannot invoke constitutional protection. 54 Accordingly, the right to collectively
bargain was not even an issue in the claimant's complaint.5 5 The claimant
53. "[T]o bargain collectively isthe performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a
written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party .
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (1970).
54. Florida cases as well as foreign decisions support the distinction between activity
which is protected by a constitution and that which is not.
The New York constitutional provision, see note 43 supra, protects employees against
legislative or judicial action which would interfere with their organization and choice of
representatives for the purpose of bargaining collectively. Additional rights must be provided by statute. For instance, in Quill v. Eisenhower, 113 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. 1952), the
court reasoned that although the right of employees to bargain cannot be enjoined, the
correlative duty of the employer to bargain must be found in the provisions of New York
labor law. In Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc. v. Davis, 18 N.Y. Misc. 2d 311, 190 N.Y.S.2d 870
(Sup. Ct. 1959), the court stated that the right to collectively bargain grants to employees
immunity from court injunctions only when involved in an actual labor dispute. If they are
not involved in the actual activity of collective bargaining as defined by statute (§876-a of
Civil Practice Law, Clevenger, current version at N.Y. Labor Law §807 (McKinney 1965)),
their activities can be limited. The best interpretation of In re Grandin's Claim, 19 App. Div.
2d 448, 243 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1963), would also illustrate that the right to collectively
bargain is not broad enough to give unemployed union members the right to refuse nonunion work and remain qualified for unemployment benefits. The right to refuse non-union
work is granted not by the constitution but by statute. See note 43 supra.
In the Florida case, Local Union No. 519 v. Robertson, 44 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1950), a union,
composed of persons not employees of the plaintiff, was properly enjoined from picketing the
plaintiff. The court determined that no valid controversy existed between the union and the
plaintiff and that, therefore, the union was not picketing for legitimate reasons. The union
action was illegitimate for two reasons: first, the closed shop agreement it was attempting to
force on the plaintiff was illegal in that it violated the right to work provision; second, there
was no dispute in the employer-employee relationship and hence the union was not meeting
its purpose of representing the bargaining interests of the employees.
These cases seem to indicate that collective bargaining is an activity engaged in by a
union to improve working conditions with an employer. Any rights beyond that may not fall
under constitutional protection and must be created by statute.
55. By way of analogy, this method of construing a constitutional provision according to
its strict meaning was used by Justice Black dissenting in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 507 (1965). In response to Justice Douglas' expansive approach by which Douglas found
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asserted not the unrestrained freedom to bargain with his employer, but an
unprotected freedom from having to decide between union membership and
unemployment compensation.
Furthermore, the dissenting argument is deficient in that it fails to adequately follow the public policy of the State of Florida. By asserting that a
union member may refuse work while a nonmember may not, the dissent was
advocating a union-supportive, rather than a neutral state policy.5 6 Without a
constitutional provision authorizing such a generalized pro-union stance, the
court is restricted 7 to the public policy expressed by the legislature.58 Inasmuch
as the Florida legislature has not adopted a strong union preference, 9 except
in the area of collective bargaining, the threat of losing union membership or
benefits should not be considered serious enough to modify the standards of
disqualification in unemployment compensation.60
a right to privacy in the penumbra of explicit rights, Justice Black said, "I get nowhere in
this case by talk about a constitutional 'right of privacy' as an emanation from one or more
constitutional provisions. I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some
specific constitutional provision." Id. at 509. "There are, of course, guarantees in certain
specific constitutional provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times
and places with respect to certain activities .... But I think it belittles that Amendment to
talk about it as though it protects nothing but 'privacy.'" Id. at 508.
56. The Supreme Court of Ohio condemned such preferential treatment in the administration of government programs because it would interfere with the uniform administration of
the law. Chambers v. Owens-Ames-Kimball Co., 146 Ohio St. 559, 67 N.E.2d 439 (1946).
"Government cannot abdicate and permit any person or group of persons by private action
or determination to qualify or disqualify an applicant for governmental benefits such as ...
unemployment compensation. On the contrary, an applicant for such benefits may be obliged
to suffer disqualification for participation in such benefits if he attaches as a requisite to his
employment some condition which is in conflict with a uniform administration of the law."
Id. at 571, 67 N.E.2d at 445.
57. This is not to say that judges may not make policy determinations. Their evaluations
of what the public policy is, however, should bank heavily on the voice of representational
government. With this in mind the court should consider the work refusal requirements
which the legislature has designed to maximize the effectiveness of unemployment insurance
in conquering economic hardship and distress. "Recognition that protection against the
economic consequences of wage loss is a legitimate aim of government has brought with it
the imposition of work refusal requirements to define properly the scope of the protection to
be afforded." Mandelker, supra note 25, at 477. See also Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947), which said
that it is the role of the legislature and not the judiciary to effectuate a change in the
standards of suitability for claimants of unemployment benefits. The legislature is in the
best position to determine a shift in public policy. Id. at 49, 50 A.2d at 341.
58. As discussed in notes 43, 54 supra, the New York legislature has adopted a pro-union
stance in the administration of unemployment benefits. Such a pro-union policy is an indication of the concentration of unionization in the state. See Mandelker, supra note 25, at 507,
516.
59. See note 18 supra.
60. One reason for this view was expressed in Mandelker, supra note 25, at 514: "Many
feel that unemployment compensation, like poor relief, should only provide aid at a subsistence level, without regard to previous employment. Work refusal requirements are also
important in the prevention of fraud, and union-oriented refusals that have only a personal
basis must be viewed from this perspective .

. .

. If the program is intended to force the
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